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INTRODUCTION

T

homas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions highlights the critical term
“paradigm shi,” which occurs when it suddenly becomes evident that earlier
assumptions are no longer correct. The plurality of the scientiﬁc community
studying this domain accepts the change. These paradigm-shiing events can be
scientiﬁc ﬁndings or, as in the social sciences, a system shock that creates a punctured
equilibrium, triggering a leap forward acquiring new knowledge.
In information warfare, the government lines of eﬀort have been to engage fake news,
intercept electoral interference, ﬁght extremist social media as the primary combat theater in the information space, and use the tools to inﬂuence a targeted audience to defend
against an adversary that seeks to inﬂuence our population. The COVID-19 pandemic generates a rebuttal, or at least a challenge, of the information warfare assumption that our
government’s authority, legitimacy, and control are mainly challenged by tampering with
the electoral system, fueling extremist views, and distributing fake political news. The fake
news and extremist social media content exploit fault lines in our society and create civil
disturbances, tensions between federal and local government, and massive protests that
impact only a fraction of the population. We have seen with COVID-19, for example, public health has a far more powerful eﬀect on public sentiment and is more likely to create
reactions of larger magnitude within the citizenry, which ripple out. These ripple eﬀects
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have been hard to predict. The long-term psychological,
societal, and health impacts of COVID-19 events have
still not yet unfolded. As an example, according to the
National Bureau of Economic Research, no other historic pandemic event has aﬀected the stock market as profoundly as COVID-19.[1]
SOCIETAL PRIORITIES
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COVID-19 has provided an essential data set for understanding what matters to the population. The environmental aspect of cyber defense, linked to public
health, has not drawn attention as a national security
matter. As living beings, we react to threats to our living space and the immediate environment. Jeopardizing the environment, intentionally or unintentionally,
has historically led to the direct injection of fear and
strong reactions in the population. Even unexpected
accidents with environmental impact have triggered
strong moves in public sentiment towards fear, panic,
anger against the government, and challenges to public
authority. One example is Chernobyl, which according
to former Soviet leader Gorbachev was accredited as the
reason for the Soviet collapse ﬁve years later as the popular lost faith in their government and their ability to
protect their citizens.[2]
An adversary seeks eﬀects that support its agenda and strategy. If an adversary engages in information operations, there is a goal and endgame that it
is trying to achieve. From the adversary’s perspective, what impact can it have on a US Presidential
election, and does it matter whether a Democratic
or Republican President is elected? What is the upside? The inference is concerning, and adequate
resources are dedicated to addressing the problem.[3] However, if we look at the actual changes
to policy outcome, the interference will likely not
meet the intended goals of swaying the elections.
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US defense spending and its grand impact on the
world order have been nearly consistent over the decades. Even when presidents and political leaders have
made drastic policy decisions, the actual change in the
geopolitical landscape has been marginal. As a recent
example, President Trump’s movement of troops from
Germany to Poland, Belgium, and Italy is simply a rearrangement and a new geopolitical position. From a
Russian perspective, with an increasingly more military-able Poland and increasing commitment from
several NATO countries, the US movement of troops
out of Germany does not change the current situation.
Until COVID-19, the return on the Russian information
warfare investment was not present if the intended
goal were to directly impact US policy and general sentiment. Groups and fragments of the population have
been impacted, but the general population and large
parts of the government and political machinery have
been unaﬀected. We have seen that COVID-19 and information operations have fueled public health concerns and those fears are producing sentiment swings
and foreign inﬂuence at a higher magnitude.
According to Kenneth Waltz, it is not what you do, but
instead what you can do, that gives you the power.[4] A
foreign adversary can gain more inﬂuence over popular
sentiment through threatening to harm the immediate
environment and public health, especially as these adversaries do not subscribe to the same ethics, code of
conduct, and playbook as the US. COVID-19 has shown
that cyber-attacks which create environmental and
health threats, even those with a very low probability
of occurring, can cause drastic swings in sentiment. Cyber-attacks that threaten public health and the citizens’
immediate environment put the government’s legitimacy, authority, and control under pressure, and trigger a
signiﬁcant decrease in citizen conﬁdence in the current
political leadership. The magnitude of such impacts
can hardly be created by tweets and fake news, or rally
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extremists on social media because these events can be
proven false and quickly forgotten by the public. Still,
plausible threats to health and environment have a lasting impact.
Humans have survived thousands of years by learning and adapting to avoid threats to life and limb. Therefore, cyber-attacks that trigger fears of threats to public
health and personal life have a massive initial impact
and lasting eﬀects which inﬂuence general perception
and policy.
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One such example is the Three Mile Island accident,
which created signiﬁcant public turbulence and fear and
still profoundly impacted how we envision nuclear power. For a covert state actor that seeks to cripple society,
embarrass the political leadership, and project to the
world that we cannot defend ourselves, environmental
damages are inviting.[5] An attack on the environment
feels to the general public more close and scary than
a dozen servers malfunctioning in a server park. It is
tangible and quickly becomes personable and relatable,
beyond what politically incendiary memes and social
media storms can create.
We are all dependent on clean drinking water and
non-toxic air. Cyber-attacks on these fundamentals for
life could create panic and desperation in the general
public–even if the reacting citizens were not directly
aﬀected.[6]
The last decade’s study of cyber has le the environmental risk posed by cyber-controlled networks unaddressed.[7] The focus on cybersecurity has included
providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating detection, protection, and reactive capabilities. From information security’s early inception in the
1980s to today’s secured environments, we have become
skilled in our ability to secure and harden information
systems. The interest in critical infrastructure is to a high
degree concerned with accessibility, dependence, and
availability, that the systems are working, and restoring
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their working condition aer an attack. However, the long-lasting impact of threats to human
health or the immediate environment drives sentiment and aﬀects policy more seriously than
a temporary loss of service. Environmental eﬀects such as contamination of drinking water, degradation of ecosystem’s functionality, toxic agents released, and ﬂooding with massive
soil erosion arising would be dramatic and long-term. Environmental damages and threats to
our immediate environment are tangible and highly visible, as problems like ﬂooding, loss of
drinkable water, pandemics, biological hazards, mudslides, toxic air, and chemical spills directly aﬀect the population and its surrounding environment. A failed computer server park does
not drive media attention, nor can a few hundred tweets create such an impact on the public
sentiment as a hundred thousand dead ﬁsh ﬂoating down a river because of an environmental
cyber-attack. The environmental impact is visible, connects with people on a visceral level, and
generates a notion that human existence is in jeopardy. Humans put survival ﬁrst.
Environmental damages trigger radical shis in the public mind and general sentiment. For
a minor state actor, such as an adversarial developing nation, these attacks can be conducted
with a limited budget and resources while still creating signiﬁcant political turbulence and
loss of conﬁdence by a targeted major state actor’s population. Conﬂict and potential war, as
mentioned, seek to change policy and inﬂuence another nation to take steps that it earlier was
unwilling to take. The widespread anxiety and stress that can follow environmental damages is
a political force worth recognizing, which COVID-19 has evidenced. Systematic cyber-attacks
that threaten public health will likely generate inﬂuence with enough momentum to change
national policy.
LOSS OF LEGITIMACY AND AUTHORITY
Successful covert cyber-attacks that lead to environmental impact are troublesome for the
government–the speciﬁc damage to systems and the challenge to legitimacy, authority, and
conﬁdence in the government and political leadership. The citizens expect the state to protect
them. The protection of the citizenry is one of the core elements in the concept of a democratic
government. The security of citizens is a part of the unwritten social contract between citizens
and their government. The federal government’s ability to protect is taken for granted. If the
government fails to protect and safeguard its citizens, its legitimacy is challenged. Legitimacy
concerns not who can lead, but who can govern. A failure to protect is an inability to govern
the nation, and legitimacy is eroded. Institutional stability can be aﬀected, which destabilizes
the nation. The political scientist Dwight Waldo believed that we need faith in government;
for the government to have strong legitimacy, it has to project, deliver, and promise that life is
better for its citizens. In a democracy, the voters need a sense that they are represented, the
government works for their best interests, and the government will improve the quality of life
for its citizens. In the Administrative State, Waldo deﬁned his vision of the “good life” as the best
possible life for the population that can be achieved based on time, technology, and resources.
[8]
Authority is the ability to implement policy.
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Environmental hazards that lead to loss of life and a dramatic long-term decrease in quality
of life for citizens trigger a demand for the government to act. If the population questions the
government’s ability to protect and safeguard it, the government’s legitimacy and authority
will suﬀer. In the Three Mile Island accident, the event impacted sentiment and risk perception, even decades aer the incident, of how citizens perceived the government’s nuclear policies and ability to ensure that nuclear power was safe.
President Carter needed to demonstrate the ability to handle the incident and restore the
general public’s conﬁdence in government policies. Environmental risks tend to appeal to the
general public’s logic and emotions, especially uncertainty and fear, and a population that fears
the future has instantly lost conﬁdence in the government.
The diﬀerence between the Three Mile Island accident and cyber-attacks on infrastructure
that create environmental damage is that, during the Three Mile Island accident millions of
Americans had a real fear for their life and future when faced with the possibility of a nuclear
meltdown. Cyber-attacks on our national infrastructure that threaten public health cannot be
predicted or potentially contained. These attacks can be massive if they exploit a shared vulnerability. Consequently, the fear generated by Three Mile Island could, in retrospect, have
been marginal in comparison to the fear caused by a large-scale cyber-attack on national infrastructure.
ENVIRONMENTAL CYBER DEFENSE
Defending US infrastructure from cyber-attacks is not only protecting information, network
availability, and the global information grid. It is also safeguarding public health and the environment, which aﬀect the citizens’ lives, their health, and their immediate living environment.
The COVID-19 epidemic demonstrated the magnitude of impact attacks on the immediate environment. The citizenry’s quality of life directly aﬀects the conﬁdence the population has in
the government’s ability to govern. From a rogue and unethical adversary’s perspective, this
represents an “opportunity” that the US needs to address by increasing the environmental
cyber defense and clarifying the intersection between public health and cyber.
DISCLAIMER
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not reﬂect the oﬃcial policy or
position of the Army Cyber Institute, the United States Military Academy, the Department of
the Army, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, or the Department of
the Interior.
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